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BAEHR v. LEWIN: QUESTIONABLE
REASONING; SOUND JUDGMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Baehr v. Lewin,1 a plurality of the Hawaii Supreme Court held that
a state statute restricting marriage to a male-female relationship discriminates on the basis of sex, and is therefore subject to "strict scrutiny"
under equal protection analysis.2 The court remanded the case for a determination as to whether the statute satisfies the criteria of strict scrutiny. 3 Curiously, the court applied the strict scrutiny test even though it
failed to find a fundamental right to same-sex marriage, and it did not
applied strict
proclaim homosexuals 4 to be a suspect class. The court
5
Virginia.
v.
Loving
to
analogy
an
scrutiny by drawing
In Loving, the State of Virginia argued that its antimiscegenation statutes did not classify on the basis of race because they equally punished
1. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
2. Because this standard is difficult to meet, commentators have perceived the decision as legitimizing same-sex marriages. See Joan Biskupic, Ruling by Hawaii's Supreme
Court Opens the Way to Gay Marriages,WASH. POST, May 7, 1993, at A10.
3. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68. To overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality required by strict scrutiny, the state must demonstrate that the statute furthers compelling
state interests and is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgements of constitutional
rights. Id.
4. Both the plurality and the dissent in Baehr emphasized that homosexuality is not
an issue in determining the constitutionality of laws prohibiting same-sex marriage. See id.
at 53 n.14; id. at 71 n.3 (Heen, J., dissenting). Indeed, same-sex marriages do not necessarily involve homosexuals, because courts have invalidated transsexual marriages on the basis that the couple was of the same sex. See Otis R. Damslet, Note, Same-Sex Marriage, 10
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 555, 563-65 n.37 (1993). Furthermore, married opposite-sex
couples may or may not be homosexual, and married same-sex couples could theoretically
be either homosexual or heterosexual. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 51 n.11. However, the issue of
homosexuality is relevant because this Note will analyze both the reasoning of the court in
Baehr, and alternative bases in which a law prohibiting same-sex marriage could be found
unconstitutional. For example, if homosexuals are declared a suspect class, laws prohibiting same-sex marriage would necessarily be struck down because realistically most samesex marriages include homosexuals. See discussion infra parts III.A, III.C. The use of
"homosexual couple" and "same-sex couple" interchangeably "reflects the traditional assumption that sexual relations are an integral part of marriage." Alissa Friedman, The
Necessity for State Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage: Constitutional Requirements and
Evolving Notions of Family, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 134, 136 n.13 (1987-1988). Indeed,
the plaintiffs in Baehr declared that they were homosexuals. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 52.
5. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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both racial groups who entered into a marriage.6 The United States
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the laws were unconstitutional because they were based on an impermissible racial classification.7
Similar to the statute in Loving, the Hawaii statute governing marriage
(HRS § 572-1)8 prohibits both males and females from entering into
same-sex marriages.9 Relying on Loving, the Baehr court found that

HRS § 572-1 discriminates on the basis of sex even though it punishes the
participants equally. 10 As such, it found that the statute violates the
equal protection clause of the Hawaii Constitution.'1

Because many laws classify on the basis of marital status, the legitimization of same-sex marriages in Hawaii would affect more than the
right to marry. For example, the eligibility of a partner's health benefits
often depends on marital status,' 2 and marital relationships often affect
the issue of consent with regard to medical procedures. 3 In addition,
many other benefits' 4 are conditioned upon marital status, including, but
not limited to: joint federal and state tax returns,1 5 dependency deductions, 6 gift and estate tax benefits,' 7 wrongful death recovery,' 8 Social
6. Id. at 7-8.
7. Id. at 11-12.
8. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (1993).

9. The Baehr court concluded that HRS § 572-1 limited marriage to opposite-sex
couples, even though the statute did not explicitly prohibit same-sex marriage. See infra
notes 142-144 and accompanying text.
10. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67-68 (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 8).
11. Id. at 67.
12. Jorge Aquino, Will Other States Say "Aloha" to Same-Sex Marriages?,RECORDER,
May 10, 1993, at 3 ("The right to marry legally would entitle gay and lesbian couples to a
host of legal rights that only heterosexuals now enjoy in Hawaii, including.., an expansion
of rights to life and health insurance ....
").
13. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 18 at
115 (5th ed. 1984). "Under certain circumstances, someone regarded as the next of kin,
such as a spouse or a niece, may have the capacity to consent, especially an emergency, to a
surgical procedure performed to save a life." Id.
14. For a discussion of the rights conditioned upon marital status, see LENORE J.
WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT: SPOUSES, LOVERS, AND THE LAW 368-69 (1981);
Baehr, 852 P.2d at 59; Adrienne K. Wilson, Note, Same-Sex Marriage: A Review, 17 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 539, 546-47 (1991); Comment, Homosexuals' Right to Marry: A Constitutional Test and Legislative Solution, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 193, 198-99 (1979).
15. I.R.C. § 6103(a) (1990) provides that "[a] husband and wife may make a single
return jointly of income taxes." See Comment, supra note 14, at 198 n.32 (explaining that
federal law must accept a state's definition of marriage because marital status is defined
under state law). E.g., HAW. REV.STAT. § 235 (1985 & Supp. 1992).
16. I.R.C. § 213(a).
17. E.g., id. §§ 2056, 2513, 2523.
18. E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-3 (1985 & Supp. 1992).
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Security Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance benefits, 19 intestate

inheritance,2" community property rights, 21 state-enforced support obli-

gations,2 2 and other benefits.23 Moreover, Baehr has an effect on the law
beyond Hawaii because other states are required to recognize the validity
of an out-of-state marriage unless it violates the strong public policy of
the state.24
Part II of this Note surveys 'both federal and state court decisions that

have prohibited same-sex marriages. Part III discusses the invocation of
strict scrutiny under fundamental rights and equal protection analyses.
Part IV introduces the Baehr decision, beginning with the facts and procedural history of the case, and then discusses the Hawaii Supreme
Court's fundamental rights and equal protection holdings. Finally, Part V

analyzes the Baehr court's rationales and proposes alternative bases for
the decision.
This Note concludes that there are difficulties in the court's holding
that HRS § 572-1 classifies on the basis of sex because the holding is inconsistent with the rationale for applying heightened scrutiny to statutes
classifying on the basis of sex. In addition, the court can be criticized for
failing to follow its own reasoning for determining the level of scrutiny to
be applied to sex-based classifications. Nonetheless, this Note concludes
that the holding is justified because the statute could be struck down
under both fundamental rights and equal protection analyses. 25 The
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1988).
20. E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 560:1-401-403 (1993) (defining rights to notice, protection, benefits, and inheritance under the Uniform Probate Code); id. ch. 533 (defining
rights relating to dower, curtesy, and inheritance).
21. E.g.. id. ch. 510 (1993).
22. E.g., id. § 572-24 (1993) (right to spousal support); id. ch. 575 (right to file a non-

support action); id. ch. 571 (award of child custody and support payments in divorce); id.
ch. 580 (post-divorce rights relating to support and property division).
23. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59 (Haw. 1993). Other available benefits under Hawaii law include: public assistance from and exemptions relating to the Department of
Human Services, HAW. REV. STAT. ch. 346; change of name, id. § 574-5(a)(3); spousal privilege and confidential marital communications, HAW. R. EVID. 505; premarital agreements, HAW. REV. STAT. ch. 572D; and the exemption of real property from attachment or
execution, id. ch. 651.

24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICrS § 283(2) (1969). "A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was contracted will everywhere be
recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public policy of another state which had the
most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage."
Id. See Aquino, supra note 12, at 3 (discussing whether other states will be required to
recognize same-sex Hawaiian marriages).
25. It certainly can be argued that courts should refrain from recognizing same-sex
marriages, leaving the issue to the legislature. See G. Sidney Buchanan, Same-Sex Mar-
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court's questionable determination that the statute classifies on the basis
of sex is a way for it to apply a strict scrutiny analysis without dealing with
such controversial issues as whether there is a fundamental right to samesex marriage, or whether homosexuals constitute a suspect class.

II.

STATE AND FEDERAL DECISIONS DENYING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

Prior to the decision in Baehr, all federal and state courts considering
the issue of same-sex marriage declined to extend state definitions of
marriage to include same-sex couples.2 6 The validity of same-sex marriage was first addressed by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Baker v.
Nelson,2 7 which denied a marriage license to two men solely because they
were of the same sex. 28 In that case, the petitioners contended that Minnesota law authorized same-sex marriages because the statute governing
marriage2 9 did not expressly prohibit them. Rejecting this argument, the
Minnesota Supreme Court implied a prohibition on same-sex marriages
based on the "common usage" of the words in the statute."0 It found that
the common usage of the term "marriage" included only unions between
persons of the opposite sex,31 as evidenced by the usage of "heterosexual
import" terms throughout the statute, such as "husband and wife" and
"bride and groom."-3 2 The petitioners further asserted that interpretating
the Minnesota statute to prohibit same-sex marriages violated the First,
Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constiriage: The Linchpin Issue, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 541, 572-73 (1985). However, a discussion of the propriety of judicial intervention is outside the scope of this Note. For a
proposed legislative solution to providing marital benefits and legal status to homosexual
couples, see Comment, supra note 14, at 213-15.
26. See Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111
(1982); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d
589 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
810 (1972); Peter G. Guthrie, Marriage Between Persons of the Same Sex, 63 A.L.R. 3d
(1975 & Supp. 1993). For a criticism of the reasoning in each case, see Damslet, supra note
4, at 563-80. Similar to Baehr, these cases considered a state's refusal to issue a marriage
license because the applicants were of the same sex. Accordingly, cases dealing with the
dissolution of same-sex unions are outside the scope of this Note. See, e.g., De Santo v.
Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d
499 (App. Div. 1971). Cases involving transsexuals are also outside the scope of this Note.
For a criticism of the reasoning in cases involving transsexuals, see Damslet, supra note 4,
at 563-65 n.37; see, e.g., M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
27. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
28. Id. at 187.
29. Id. at 185-186 (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01-.08 (West 1969)).
30. Id. at 186.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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tution.33 The court dismissed without discussion the petitioners' claims
that the statute violated their First Amendment rights of expression and
association, and the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment.3" Furthermore, it found that a fundamental right
was not violated by the prohibition because the understanding of mar33. Id. at 186 n.2.
34. Id. A claim that prohibition of same-sex marriages violates the First, Eighth, and
Ninth Amendments to the Constitution probably cannot be sustained under existing precedent. Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriages,82 YALE L.J. 573, 573-74 n.3 (1973).
Although the First Amendment rights to free speech and free assembly have been interpreted to include the right to free association, the Supreme Court has never declared a
marital union to be an association under that amendment. Id. at 573 n.3. Harvard professor Jed Rubenfeld perceives the right to privacy as the right "not to have one's life too
totally determined by a progressively more normalizing state." Jed Rubenfeld, The Right
to Privacy" 102 HARv. L. REV. 737, 784 (1989); see infra part V.B.2. for a discussion of
Rubenfeld's right to privacy analysis. Rubenfeld asserts that prohibitions on marriage implicate the right to privacy, not the First Amendment. Rubenfeld, supra at 791-92; see
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). The difference between laws that violate the First
Amendment and laws that violate the right to privacy is the degree to which the law regulates the prohibited behavior. Rubenfeld, supra at 785.
Because of the signal role that speech plays in political freedom and because of
the express constitutional guarantee, government in this country can hardly forbid or compel citizens to utter a single opinion without violating their rights. By
contrast, in privacy cases, the government must go much further before it transgresses a constitutional limit.
Id. Thus, the right to privacy is implicated by laws prohibiting same-sex marriage, where
"an existence is totally informed or occupied." The First Amendment is not implicated
because laws prohibiting same-sex marriage involve more than "a single act of enforced
loyalty." Id.
The petitioners' Eighth Amendment argument, that denial of a marriage license constituted cruel and unusual punishment, relied on Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962),
for the principle that punishment for a status or condition that is involuntary violates the
Eighth Amendment. See Note, supra at 574 n.3. In Robinson, the Court interpreted a state
law that imprisoned a narcotics addict as cruel and unusual punishment because the law
condemned a person for an "illness" that was "involuntary." Id. However, this interpretation probably does not extend beyond the context of criminal law. Id.
The petitioners' Ninth Amendment claim was based upon Justice Goldberg's concurring
opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,488-97 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring),
in which he stated that the right of marital privacy was preserved to the individual by the
Ninth Amendment. Id. at 495. Some argue that Justice Goldberg had implied that the
Ninth Amendment was made applicable against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment,
see Damslet, supra note 4, at 569 n.62; but see Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 187 n.3 (denying the
petitioners' claims under the Ninth Amendment because Justice Goldberg "stopped short"
of making such an implication). Even if Justice Goldberg had made such an implication,
the Ninth Amendment is not significant because the Fourteenth Amendment itself could
carry the argument. Note, supra at 574 n.3.
Consequently, this Note will focus on the constitutionality of laws prohibiting same-sex
marriage based on the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution and the Hawaii Constitution.
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riage as "a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation
and rearing of children within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis." '3 5 Petitioners also argued that the state's limitation on persons entitled to marry violated the equal protection clause because the statute was
underinclusive.3 6 Rejecting this argument, 37 the court simply stated that
the Constitution does not require "abstract symmetry" between a statute
and its purpose.38
In Jones v. Hallahan,39 the State of Kentucky denied a marriage license
to two women because they were of the same sex. 40 The women argued
that the denial deprived them of the right to marry, the right of association, the right to free exercise of religion, and subjected them to cruel and
unusual punishment. 4' Although Kentucky marriage laws did not specifically prohibit same-sex marriage, the court limited the definition of marriage to opposite-sex couples by citing sources similar to those in Baker:
common usage, the dictionary, and provisions of the statute that referred
to "the male and female of the species., 42 Consequently, the court found
that no constitutional provisions were involved, 43 and that "appellants are
prevented from marrying ... by their own incapability of entering into a
marriage as that term is defined." 4
The two men denied a marriage license in Singer v. Hara45 asserted
that the Washington statute governing marriage permitted same-sex unions, and alternatively, that if the statute prohibited same-sex marriages,
it violated the Washington Equal Rights Amendment (state ERA) and
the Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.46 Although the Washington statute provides that marriage
may be entered into by "persons," the court held that same-sex marriages
are prohibited because a provision of the statute refers to "the male" and
35. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186.
36. Id. They argued that although the purpose of the statute was to promote procrea-

tion, it permitted heterosexuals to marry even if they were not capable or willing to bear
children. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973).
40. Id. at 589.
41. Id.

42. Id. at 589 n.1 (citing Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN.

43.
44:
45.
46.

REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 402.210 (Michie 1968)).

Id. at 590.
Id. at 589.
522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
Id. at 1188-89.

§ 402.020-402.210 (Michie 1968) & Ky.
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"the female."4 7 The appellants in Singer next asserted that a prohibition
on same-sex marriage violated the state ERA because the state ERA
proscribes discrimination on the basis of sex.4 8 The appellants cited Loving v. Virginia4 9 in response to the state's argument that the state ERA
had not been violated because marriage licenses were denied equally to
both male and female couples.50 Agreeing with the state, the appellate
court found no analogy between the discriminatory racial classification in
Loving and the sex-based classification in the Washington statute. 5 '
Whereas the statute in Loving was unconstitutional because it used race
as a classification to prohibit interracial marriages, the court determined
that the appellants in Singer were not prohibited from marrying by the
Washington statute's sex-based classification; rather, "they are being denied entry into the marriage relationship because of the recognized definition of that relationship as one which may be entered into only by two
persons who are members of the opposite sex.",52 In considering the appellants' equal protection claim, the court upheld the classification under
a rational relationship standard of review,5 3 having determined that no
suspect classifications were at issue.5 4 In doing so, it emphasized that the
state's interest in promoting the traditional family justified denying samesex couples the right to marry.55
The courts in Baker and Singer denied marriage licenses to same-sex
couples based on a definition that limited marriage to a union between a
man and a woman. Both courts reasoned that denial of marriage licenses
to same-sex couples did not deny them the right to marry; rather, their
own inability to enter into a marriage relationship prohibited them from
marrying.56
Adams v. Howerton57 is the only federal court case to examine the is47. Id. at 1189 n.3 (citing

WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§ 26.04.010 (West Supp. 1979)).

48. Id. at 1190. The Washington ERA provides, in relevant part: "Equality of rights
and responsibility under the law shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex." Id.
For a discussion of the potential effect of a federal equal rights amendment on the recognition of same-sex marriage, see Note, supra note 34, at 583-88.
49. 388 U.S. 1 (1966).
50. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1190-91.
51. Id. at 1191.
52. Id. at 1192.

53. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
54. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1196.
55. Developments in the Law - The Constitution and the Family, 93
1157, 1284 (1980).
56. Id.
57. 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 111 (1982).

HARV.

L.

REV.
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sue of same-sex marriage. Two men, an American citizen and an Australian citizen, were married in Colorado upon the expiration of the
Australian's visa to remain in the United States.5 8 They brought an action against the Immigration and Naturalization Service because it refused to classify the Australian as an "immediate relative" of the
American based upon their marital relationship.5 9 In construing the applicable laws, the court determined that the Colorado marital statute was
inconclusive as to whether same-sex marriages were prohibited;6" however, the court held that the federal immigration statute did not recognize
same-sex marriages for immigration purposes. 6 '
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

As the foregoing cases suggest, the question of same-sex marriage implicates both the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.62 In the following sections, this Note explains the
"strict scrutiny" standard of review and its invocation under fundamental
rights and equal protection analyses.
A.

Strict Scrutiny

Although the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from denying
any person the equal protection of the laws, states must be able to draw
some distinctions among individuals in order to function effectively.6 3
Consequently, the United States Supreme Court has developed "tiers" of
review.' Under the "rational basis" test, a statute will be upheld if the
state can prove that the classification is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest. 65 However, this standard is not used in all circumstances.
Such deference would prevent the equal protection clause from fulfilling
its historical purpose-"protection of racial minorities from a hostile ma58. Id. at 1038.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1039 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104 (1973)). Interestingly, the court
declined to find the marriage invalid under state law, a proposition that would have been
supported by Baker, Jones, and Singer. Damslet, supra note 4, at 578-79.
61. Adams, 673 F.2d at 1040-41 (referring to § 201(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, codified as amended in 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)).
62. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
63. Developments in the Law, supra note 55, at 1187-88.
64. Id. at 1188.
65. Id., see, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
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Consequently, the Court has formulated a second tier of rejority."
view, "strict scrutiny," a standard that requires the state to prove that the
law is necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest.6 7 Strict
scrutiny is applied to laws that classify on the basis of suspect categories

or impinge on a fundamental right.68 Because most laws viewed under
the rational basis test are found constitutional, 69 and most laws subjected
to strict scrutiny are found unconstitutional,7 ° the standard of review is

significant.
B.

Fundamental Rights

Although petitioners in Baehr claimed violations of state constitutional
rights, it is relevant to examine United States Supreme Court decisions.
Examining the provision of the Hawaii Constitution explicitly guarantee-

ing the right to privacy, 7 ' the Baehr court determined that the provision
"encompasse[d] all of the fundamental rights expressly recognized as being subsumed within the privacy protections of the United States Constitution. ' '72 In construing the provision, the court looked to federal cases
for guidance, because the Hawaii constitution article was expressly derived from the right to privacy of the United States Constitution, and
because Hawaii courts had yet to define the right to marry.73

The United States Supreme, Court first expounded on the importance
66. Developments in the Law, supra note 55, at 1188.
67. Id. at 1189. Under the Hawaii strict scrutiny test, "laws are 'presumed to be unconstitutional unless the state shows compelling state interests which justify such classifications."' Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44,'64 (Haw. 1993) (quoting Holdman v. Olim,581 P.2d
1164, 1167 (Haw. 1978)).
68. Developments in the Law, supra note 55, at 1189; Baehr, 852 P.2d at 65-66. See,
e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (holding that any classification penalizing the right to interstate travel must meet the requirements of strict scrutiny); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (racial classifications are subject to the strict
scrutiny test).
69. Wilson, supra note 14, at 549; but see, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (striking down under rational basis review a statute classifying on
the basis of mental retardation).
70. Comment, supra note 14, at 200; but see Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214 (racial classification met demands of strict scrutiny test). For an argument that statutes prohibiting samesex marriage violate the right to privacy but would nevertheless satisfy strict scrutiny, see
generally Buchanan, supra note 25.
71. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6 (1978) ("The right of the people to privacy is recognized
and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.").
72. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 55 (Haw. 1993).
73. Id.; see State v. Mueller, 671 P.2d 1351, 1358 (Haw. 1983) (explaining that the state
court looks to the federal courts for guidance).
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of "family" rights in Meyer v. Nebraska74 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.75

It specifically elaborated on the importance of marriage in Skinner v.
Oklahoma,76 in which the Court struck down a statute that allowed the

state to sterilize "habitual criminals" without their consent. 7 The Court

recognized that the law impinged on "one of the basic civil rights of
man."7 8 It also noted that "[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental
to the very existence and survival of the race."7 9
The right to privacy doctrine was first announced in Griswold v. Connecticut,8" in which the Court struck down a state statute forbidding the
use of contraceptives by married couples.8 The Court determined "that
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance,"

thus creating "zones of privacy."8 2 The Court concluded that the marital
relationship is protected by this right to privacy.8 3 It again recognized the
unique and important nature of the marital relationship in Loving v. Virginia,84 but stopped short of proclaiming marriage a fundamental right. 5
The right to privacy was expanded in Eisenstadt v. Baird8 6 and Roe v.
74. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that a statute forbidding the teaching of any modem
language other than English in the first eight grades violates the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
75. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that a statute requiring all children to attend public
schools violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Both Meyer and
Pierce were decided on the approach that the due process clause provided substantive protection for a number of rights, especially economic rights, that are encompassed within the
term "liberty" of the clause. Developments in the Law, supranote 55, at 1162-63; see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Although this reasoning has been repudiated in the
economic context, see Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme
Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. Cr.REV. 34, 36-38, the doctrine, known as
"substantive due process," still flourishes as a means for protecting non-economic values
not contained in the Bill of Rights. Developments in the Law, supra note 55, at 1166-87.
Consequently, Meyer and Pierce are still good law.
76. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
77. Id. at 541.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
81. Id. at 485.
82. Id. at 484.
83. Id. at 485.
84. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
85. Id. at 12 ("The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."). Because marriage was not proclaimed to be a fundamental right, the holding rested on both a privacy
and an equal protection rationale. Id.
86. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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Wade87 to protect rights not traditionally recognized as fundamental. In
Eisenstadt,the Court extended the right of marital privacy announced in
Griswold to unmarried persons, holding that a statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried couples violated the equal protection clause.' Although Eisenstadt was decided on equal protection
rather than fundamental rights grounds, the decision expanded the right
of privacy to individuals.8 9 "If the right of privacy means anything, it is
the right of the individual,married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion .... ,9 In Roe, the Court held that the right to
privacy protected a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy. 9 ' The Court determined that the guarantee of personal privacy includes "only personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' 92 Although the right of privacy is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the Court held that it
can be found in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal
liberty.93
The right to marriage was explicitly declared fundamental in Zablocki
v. Redhail.9 4 In that case, the Court found unconstitutional a statute providing that a parent who failed to comply with child support orders was
95
prohibited from marrying without court permission. Applying a strict
scrutiny analysis because of the infringement on the fundamental right of
marriage, the Court found that the statute violated the equal protection
clause.

96

The Court, however, has refused to construe the right of privacy to
87. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
88. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454-55.
89. Id. at 453.
90. Id. (emphasis in original).
91. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
92. Id. at 152 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
93. Id. at 152-53.
94. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). The Court determined that its previous decisions "make clear
that the right to marry is of fundamental importance" for all individuals. Id. at 383.
95. Id. at 382.
96. Id. at 386-87; but see Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977) (applying rational basis
scrutiny in upholding a provision that reduced the benefits of a certain class of persons
upon marriage). The Court reconciled Zablocki and Jobst on the grounds that the statute
in Zablocki "interfere[d] directly and substantially with the right to marry." Zablocki, 434

U.S. at 387. Thus, a significant interference with the right to marry is subject to strict
scrutiny; a lesser interference is subject to rational basis scrutiny. Developments in the
Law, supra note 55, at 1251. Statutes prohibiting same-sex marriage are therefore subjected to strict scrutiny, because the complete denial of a marriage license is a direct and
substantial interference with the fundamental right to marry.
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include matters involving homosexual relationships. In Bowers v. Hardwick,97 a five to four majority of the Supreme Court held that a state

statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy did not violate the right to privacy.98 Writing for the majority, Justice White characterized the issue as

"whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy." 9 9 Utilizing the tests that fundamental rights must be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that
"neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they) were sacrificed"' 10 and
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,"''1 1 the Court concluded that the right to engage in homosexual sodomy was not
fundamental.'0 2
C. Equal Protection
In Baehr, the Hawaii Supreme Court had to determine the test to be
applied to sex-based classifications in order to assess their validity under
the equal protection clause of the state constitution. 1 3 In formulating
the standard, the Baehr court looked to the case law of the United States
Supreme Court." °4 Consequently, it is important to analyze United

States Supreme Court decisions on equal protection.
A "suspect class" is "a disadvantaged group deemed to need special
judicial protection.' 1 5 The Supreme Court has determined that race, 0 6
national origin, 0 7 and to some extent, alienage, 0 8 are suspect classifications.' 09 Classifications based on gender are subject to an intermediate

standard of scrutiny, which lies between strict scrutiny and rational ba97. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
98. Id. at 190-91.
99. Id. at 190.

100. Id. at 191-92 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
101. Id. at 191-92 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).

102. Id. at 191.
103. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63-68 (Haw. 1993).
104. Id. at 66.
105. Comment, supra note 14, at 200. See Developments in the Law, supra note 55, at
1189. "A suspect class is normally a 'discrete and insular minority' that has been 'saddled
with disabilities or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process."' Id. (quoting San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
106. E.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
107. E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
108. E.g., id. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978) (upholding classification
based on alienage under rational basis scrutiny).
109. Developments in the Law, supra note 55, at 1189.
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sis. 110 Under current law, classifications based on sexual orientation are

not suspect under the equal protection clause.' 11 The Supreme Court has
never considered the standard of review applicable to such classifications,
112
and has declined the opportunity to do so.
Reed v. Reed" 3 was the first Supreme Court decision to invalidate a
gender classification under the equal protection clause. Applying only a
rational basis test, the Court found unconstitutional a statute preferring
males over females as executors of wills.'1 4 Two years later, in Frontiero
v. Richardson," 5 a plurality of the Court found that classifications based
on sex are inherently suspect and thus subject to strict scrutiny. 11 6 However, subsequent case law has clarified the current governing test: "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and
117
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."
Although heightened scrutiny originally was provided to strike down
laws discriminating against women, it eventually extended to laws that
discriminated against men."" ' The subjection of classifications discrimi-

nating against men to a strict scrutiny analysis illustrates that classifications based on gender will be invalidated when they perpetuate
stereotypes about the role of either sex. 119
The Hawaii Supreme Court was first confronted with a sex-based classification in Holdman v. Olim, 12 0 in which plaintiff challenged a prison
rule requiring women visitors to be fully clothed, including undergar-

ments. 12 1 The court found it unnecessary to determine the standard of
110. Friedman, supra note 4, at 145; Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 724 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Legislative classifications based
on gender "have been held to be unconstitutional unless substantially related to an important state interest." Friedman, supra note 4, at 145.
111. Friedman, supra note 4, at 147.
112. Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009 (1985), denying cert. to 730
F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984).
113. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
114. Ld
115. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
116. Id. at 688.
117. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199,
209 (1977); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977).
118. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982) ("That this statutory policy discriminates against males rather than against females does not exempt it from
scrutiny or reduce the standard of review.").
119. Id. at 729.
120. 581 P.2d 1164 (Haw. 1978).
121. Id. at 1166. Plaintiff was not allowed to enter the prison because she was not
wearing a brassiere. Id.
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review for sex-based classifications because it concluded that the classifi122
cation could survive even under the strict scrutiny test.

IV.
A.

BAEHR v. LEWIN

Facts and Lower Court Opinion

In Baehr, the marriage license applications of three couples were denied solely on the basis that the applicants were of the same sex. 12 3 The
applicant couples filed suit against the Department of Health, alleging
that its interpretation and application of HRS § 572-1 as prohibiting
same-sex marriage violated their right to privacy, 2 a and their rights to
equal protection and due process of law 125 as guaranteed by the Hawaii
Constitution.
The circuit court order granting defendant's motion for judgment 1on
26
the pleadings contained findings of fact relating to homosexuality.
Based on these "facts,"' 127 the circuit court determined that there is no
fundamental right to enter into a homosexual marriage because the right
to privacy provision of the Hawaii Constitution protects only heterosexual marriages. 12 8 The court also determined that no fundamental right to
same-sex marriage exists under the due process clause of the Hawaii Constitution. 129 Employing a "rational relationship" standard of review, the
circuit court denied that homosexuals were a "suspect class" for the purposes of equal protection analysis. 3 It concluded that HRS § 572-1 is
"clearly a rational, legislative effort to advance the general welfare of the
community by permitting only heterosexual couples to legally marry."''
122. Id. at 1167.
123. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 49 (Haw. 1993).
124. HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 6 (1988) ("The right of the people to privacy is recognized
and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest. The legislature shall take affirmative steps to implement this right.").
125. Id. § 5 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of
the person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race,
religion, sex or ancestry.").
126. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 53-54. For example, the circuit court determined that "the issue
of whether homosexuality constitutes an immutable trait has generated much dispute in
the relevant scientific community." Id. at 53.
127. The circuit court made findings of fact notwithstanding the absence of any evidentiary record before it. Id.
128. Id. at 54.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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B.

The Hawaii Supreme Court Decision

The Right to Privacy Does Not Include a FundamentalRight to
Same-Sex Marriage

1.

a. The Right to Marry Does Not Extend to Same-Sex Couples
The Hawaii Supreme Court first addressed plaintiffs' arguments that
HRS § 572-1 violated their rights to privacy and due process of law under
the Hawaii Constitution, as interpreted by federal law. 132 The Baehr
court interpreted Zablocki to provide an implicit link "between the right
to marry, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of procreation,
childbirth, abortion, and child rearing" because the right to marry "is simply the logical predicate of the others.' 1 33 As such, it found that the fundamental right34to marry "presently contemplates unions between men
and women."'
b.

The Present Boundaries of the FundamentalRight to Marriage
Should Not Be Extended to Include Same-Sex Couples

After determinfng that the right to marry does not include the right to
same-sex marriage, the Baehr court inquired next whether the right to
marry can be extended to include same-sex unions. 135 Examining
whether same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry, the court
turned "to the 'traditions and [collective] conscience of our people' to
determine whether a principle is 'so rooted [there]... as to be ranked as
fundamental.'"1 36 Finding that a right to same-sex marriage has not been
traditionally recognized, the court held that "the applicant couples do not
have a fundamental constitutional right to same-sex marriage arising out
1 37
of the right to privacy or otherwise.'
2. HRS § 572-1, On Its Face, Discriminates Based On Sex, Thereby
Implicating the Equal Protection Clause of Article I, Section
5 of the Hawaii Constitution
The equal protection clause of the Hawaii Constitution is more expan132. For a discussion of the development of the right to privacy under the United States
Constitution, see supra part 1IIB.
133. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 56.
134. Id.

135. Id at 56-57.
136. Id. at 57 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring)).
137. Id.
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sive than its federal counterpart.' 38 Whereas the equal protection clause
to the United States Constitution is couched in general terms, the Hawaii
provision specifies that "[n]o person shall... be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the person's civil rights
or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex, or ancestry."' 3 9 Thus, the court determined that the Hawaii
Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. 140
a. HRS § 572-1 Establishes a Sex-Based Classification
The Baehr court determined that HRS § 572-1 was facially discriminatory, even though it does not explicitly prohibit same-sex marriage. 14 ' It
concluded that marriage is limited to opposite-sex couples because the
provisions of the statute refer to opposite-sex relationships. 42 For example, it prohibits marriage between "brother and sister," "uncle and
' 43
niece," and "aunt and nephew.'
Because HRS § 572-1 regulated access to the status of marriage on the
basis of the applicants' sex, the Baehr court next considered whether the
applicant couples had been denied the equal protection of the laws. 1 44 It
concluded that the statute implicated equal protection because its prohibition of same-sex marriage constitutes discrimination on the basis of
5
sex.

14

In response to the state precedents advanced by the defendant, the
court found Baker v. Nelson 146 and De Santo v. Barnsley14 7 inapplicable
148
because no state constitutional questions were addressed in either case.
Although Jones v. Hallahan149 did not address equal protection rights, the
court discussed it in order to "unmask the tautological and circular nature
138. Id. at 59-60.
139. HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 5 (1988).
140. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1(1) (Supp. 1994).
144. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60.
145. Id. at 60-61. The court explained its conclusion only by distinguishing state cases
that have prohibited same-sex marriages, and by refuting the dissent's argument. See id. at
61-63, 67-68.
146. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). For a discussion of the facts and holding in the case, see supra part II.
147. 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
148. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61.
149. 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973). For a discussion of the facts and holding in the case,
see supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
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of Lewin's argument that HRS § 572-1 does not implicate article I, section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution because same sex marriage is an innate
impossibility." 15
In Jones, the court reasoned that "the relationship proposed by the appellants does not authorize the issuance of a marriage license because
Analogous to the Jones rationwhat they propose is not a marriage.''
ale, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals declared in Loving v. Virginia'12 that interracial marriage did not exist because "[t]he fact that
[God] separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to
mix.' ', 5 3

In striking down the antimiscegenation statute, the Supreme

Court rejected the argument that mixed race marriages should not be
recognized because they had never been the "custom."'1 54 The Baehr
court applied this rationale to the context of same-sex marriages, concluding that a "custom" is not a valid basis for prohibiting same-sex unions.15 5 Furthermore, it stated that "constitutional law may mandate, like
it or not, that customs change with an evolving social order.' 56 Consequently, the court also rejected the Singer v. Hara5 7 rationale that the
appellants "were denied a marriage license because of the nature of mar'
riage itself."158
The dissent argued that HRS § 572-1 did not discriminate on the basis
of sex because it applied equally to both sexes.' 59 Under the statute,
"[n]either sex is being granted a right or benefit the other does not have,
1 60
and neither sex is being denied a right or benefit that the other has.'
The dissent cited a Wisconsin state case for the proposition that a statute
only discriminates based on sex when it discriminates on its face or in
effect between males and females.' 6
In reply, the plurality contended that the dissent's thesis was explicitly
considered and rejected by the Loving Court. 6 2 In Loving, the state ar150. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63.
151. Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 590.
152. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
153. Id. at 3 (quoting the trial judge).
154. Id. at 11.
155. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63.
156. Id.
157. 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
158. Id. at 1196.
159. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 71 (Heen, J.; dissenting).
160. Id. at 71 (emphasis in original).
161. Id. at 71-72 (Heen, J., dissenting) (citing Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Comm'n,
482 N.W.2d 121, 129 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992)).
162. Id. at 67-68.
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gued that the antimiscegenation statutes did not discriminate on the basis
of race because they punished equally both racial groups who entered
into a marriage.163 The Baehr court quoted the Loving Court's declaration, "we reject the notion that the mere 'equal application' of a statute
containing racial classifications is enough to remove the classifications
from the Fourteenth Amendment's proscriptions of all invidious discriminations."'" The Baehrcourt proposed that the "[s]ubstitution of 'sex' for
'race' and article I; section 5 for the fourteenth amendment ,ields 165 the
conclusion that HRS § 572-1 discriminates on the basis of sex,just as the
statute at issue in Loving discriminated on the basis of race, even though
1 66
both statutes punished the participants equally.'
b. Sex is a "Suspect Category" for Purposes of Equal Protection
Analysis under Article I, Section 5 of the Hawaii
Constitution, and HRS § 572-1. is Subject to the
"Strict Scrutiny" Test
Having determined that HRS § 572-1 established a sex-based classification, the Baehr court considered the standard of review for such classifications. Although Holdman v. Olim16 7 did not decide on a test,' 6 8 it did
look to federal law for guidance.' 6 9 Thus, the Baehr court reasoned that
the standard for sex-based classifications could be determined by looking
170
at the then current case law of the United States Supreme Court.
The court examined Frontiero v. Richardson,'7 ' in which the United
States Supreme Court applied a strict scrutiny test for gender classifications. 1 72 Although a strict scrutiny analysis was adopted by only a plurality, the concurring opinion of Justice Powell indicates that he and Justice
Blackmun would have joined the plurality had the Federal Equal Rights
Amendment been adopted. 73 The Baehr court concluded that, "had the
Equal Rights Amendment been incorporated into the United States Con163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1966).
Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68 (quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 8).
Id.
Id.
581 P.2d 1164 (Haw. 1978).
Id. at 1170; see discussion of Holdman supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
Holdman, 581 P.2d at 1167.

170. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 66 (emphasis in original). For a discussion of the standard of
review applied to sex-based classifications under the United States Constitution, see supra
part III.C.
171. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
172. Id. at 688.

173. Id. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring). In considering whether strict scrutiny was the
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stitution, at least seven members of the Frontierocourt ... would have
subjected statutory sex-based classifications to 'strict' judicial scrutiny."' 174 Because Hawaii had added an equal rights amendment, the
Baehr court held that sex was a suspect category under article I, section1755
of the Hawaii Constitution and was subject to the strict scrutiny test.
Therefore, the court held that: "(1) HRS § 572-1 is presumed to be unconstitutional (2) unless Lewin, as an agent of the state of Hawaii, can
show that (a) the statute's sex-based classification is justified by compelling state interests and (b) the statute is narrowly drawn to avoid unnec76
essary abridgements of the applicant couples' constitutional rights."'

V.

ANALYSIS AND ALTERNATIVE RATIONALES

A.

The Baehr Court's Reasoning

The Baehr court's analogy between statutes prohibiting interracial marriages and statutes prohibiting same-sex marriages seems persuasive due
177
to the remarkable resemblance between the Loving quote and the situation at issue. However, the court misquoted Loing. The Supreme
Court specifically mentioned the Fourteenth Amendment's proscription
against "all invidious racial discriminations."1 78 This specific reference to
racial discrimination suggests that the Loving rationale does not transfer
179
easily to another context; it may be limited to racial discrimination.
Indeed, the Loving court stressed the fact that the statute involved
race: "[t]he clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was
to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimnation in
the States." ' 180 Nonetheless, the analogy survives because the Baehr court
does not depend on the Fourteenth Amendment; its decision is based on
proper standard of review, Justice Powell stated, "[t]he Equal Rights Amendment ...if
adopted will resolve the substance of this precise question." Id.
174. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See supra note 164 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Loving analogy.
178. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967) (emphasis added).
179. The court in Baker distinguished Loving on the basis that the decision hinged
"solely on the grounds of its patent racial discrimination." Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d
185, 187 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). The Singer court distinguished Loving because striking down statutes prohibiting miscegenation would not
change "the basic definition of marriage as the legal union of one man and one woman."
Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1192 n.8 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). For a discussion of Baker,
see supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Singer, see supra notes
45-56 and accompanying text.
180. Loving, 388 U.S. at 10.
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Hawaii's equal protection amendment, which specifically prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. However, the analogy is still imperfect
because, whereas Virginia's miscegenation statute obviously "rest[ed]
solely upon distinctions drawn according to race,' 8 1 it is unclear whether
HRS § 572-1 discriminates on the basis of sex.
It has been argued that "[a] statute or administrative policy which permits a man to marry a woman, subject to certain regulatory restrictions,
but categorically denies him the right to marry another man clearly entails a classification along sexual lines.' 1 82 The argument seems logical,
but it does not consider the reasons that discrimination on the basis of sex
is prohibited. The United States Supreme Court has invalidated classifications that discriminate on the basis of sex where they perpetuate stereotypes about the role of either sex. 1 8 1 Indeed, it is difficult to argue
that statutes prohibiting same-sex marriage have the same effect as other
statutes that discriminate on the basis of sex, such as a statute preferring
men over women as executors of wills." 8 Constitutional scholar Kenneth
Karst criticizes the Loving analogy:
[f]or all its abstract symmetry, such a mechanical view of the
issue is unhelpful. What makes a miscegenation law invalid, after all, is not merely that it classifies on the basis of race, but
that it is designed to promote white supremacy. Surely there is
no comparable implication of male inferiority in a rule limiting a
85
man's choice of marriage partners to females.'
It is unsound to apply heightened scrutiny to statutes that discriminate on
the basis of sex when the reasons for applying heightened scrutiny no
longer exist. Professor William Eskridge states that:
[a] gap in the analogy to Loving is that the connection between
the discriminatory classification (sex) and the harm (reinforcing
gender stereotypes) is abstract and hard to connect with legislative motivations. Judges may find it difficult to understand how
denying two gay men the right to8 6marry is driven by an ideology
that oppresses straight women.1
However, Eskridge fills this "gap" by arguing that discrimination on the
181. Id. at 11.
182. Note, supra note 34, at 583.
183. See supra part III.C.
184. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
185. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 683
(1980).
186. William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419,
1509-10 (1993).
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basis of sexual orientation implicates the equal protection clause because
it is a form of discrimination on the basis of sex. 1 87 However, this argument does not fill the gap in Baehr because the court did not make findings to determine or even consider whether discrimination on the basis of
homosexuality constituted discrimination on the basis of sex. Without
this argument and findings in support to fill the logical "gap," statutes
prohibiting same-sex marriage do not discriminate on the basis of sex.
Although intermediate scrutiny is the standard for sex-based classifications under the United States Constitution, 88 the Baehr court decided to
apply strict scrutiny to such classifications.18 9 It arrived at this standard
by a strange route. Examining Holdman, the Baehr court found that the
standard could be derived by looking at the then current case law of the
United States Supreme Court.' 90 However, it chose to adopt the strict
scrutiny standard set forth in Frontiero, a case decided in 1973, rather
than the intermediate standard that was currently being applied when
Holdman was decided. 91 The Holdman court recognized, after citing
Frontiero,that "subsequent cases have made it clear that the current governing test under the Fourteenth Amendment [to the United States Constitution] is a standard intermediate between rational basis and strict
scrutiny.' 92 Moreover, the phrase "then current case law" does not refer
to the test governing when Hawaii's equal rights amendment was
adopted. The amendment was adopted in 1978;193 the decision that established the intermediate standard, Craig v. Boren, was decided in
1976.194

It seems that the Baehr court did not follow its own proposition that
187. Id. at 1510. See Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender,
1988 Wis. L. REV. 187. The author explains that "heterosexism reinforces the social meaning of gender by affirming a sex-differentiated, patriarchal conception of marriage." Id. at
232. In addition, Kenneth Karst argues that discrimination against homosexuals constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex by stating:
In the case of a lesbian marriage ... it is arguable that historic assumptions about
the need for a male-headed nuclear family play some role in the state's withholding of recognition of the relationship. And, by extension, it is arguable that the
denial of marriage to homosexual men similarly supports the traditional nuclear
family, with its potential for maintaining male domination.
Karst, supra note 185, at 683-84. See infra part V.C.
188. See supra part III.C.
189. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993).
190. See supra part IV.B.2.b.
191. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67; Holdman v. Olim, 581 P.2d 1164, 1167 (Haw. 1978).
192. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 64 (quoting Holdman, 581 P.2d at 1167).
193. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5 (1988).
194. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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Holdman directed it to look to the "then current case law of the United
States Supreme Court." Rather, the court decided to adopt Frontiero's
reasoning because "[o]f the decisions of the United States Supreme Court
cited in Holdman, Frontiero v. Richardson... was by far the most significant., 19 5 However, it is difficult to perceive how Frontierowas the "most
significant" case cited in Holdman. The Holdman court did not single it
out in any way; it simply discussed Frontiero among other cases that had
1 96
considered the standard for sex-based classifications.
Although the court did not arrive at a principled reason to invoke strict
scrutiny, it was still within its power to adopt a more stringent test than
that utilized by the United States Supreme Court. Indeed, it recognized
the "long-standing principle that this court is free to accord greater protections to Hawaii's citizens under the state constitution than are recognized under the United States Constitution."19' 7 Thus, the fact that the
court ignored its own construction of case law to support invoking strict
scrutiny is not erroneous; however, it may be important in revealing the
court's motivation. The court's search for a basis to invoke strict scrutiny
only to arbitrarily accept it reflects the court's belief that strict scrutiny is
justifiable. Indeed, strict scrutiny would be the standard under other,
more controversial rationales that the court may support, but may not be
prepared to adopt.
B. Fundamental Rights
1.

Does the Right to Marry Include Same-Sex Marriage?

It is difficult to argue that the 'right to marriage as articulated in
Zablocki includes same-sex unions.' 98 First, the Zablocki Court emphasized that the fundamental right to marriage did not prohibit the state
from enacting any laws burdening the right.
By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry,
we do not mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates in any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage
must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions
195. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 66.
196. Holdman, 581 P.2d at 1167.
197. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 65-66.
198. See Comment, supra note 14, at 200-01; see also Arthur G. LeFrancois, The Constitution and the "Right" to Marry: A JurisprudentialAnalysis, 5 OKLA. CiTY U. L. REV., 507,
554 (1980) (noting that the prohibition on same-sex marriages is justified on utilitarian
grounds).
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to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be
imposed. 199
Second, the Zablocki court's concern with the right of an opposite-sex
2 00
couple to marry does not necessarily transfer to same-sex marriages.
Same-sex couples have been denied the right to marry based on a narrow definition of "marriage" as a union between a man and a woman that
involves procreation.2 0 ' However, a more contemporary definition of
marriage could include the right to same-sex marriage. Indeed, courts
need to reassess their view of marriage as characterized by procreation
and child-bearing in the context of modem developments. 2 One commentator has noted that although "procreation and child-rearing are descriptive characteristics of marriage ... [they do] not tell us what is the
essence of marriage., 20 3 This commentator perceives the purposes of
modern marriages to be an economic partnership and a mental coalition.2 0 4 Same-sex marriages would satisfy both of these purposes because
neither is affected by the sex of the couple.
Similarly, another commentator has argued that "contemporary attitudes toward the marital relationship have changed and are continuing to
change. ' 20 5 As such, the modem marital relationship embodies many
purposes:
It is a voluntary public commitment of two people to accept certain socially imposed obligations toward each other. It contemplates living together for some period of time. It involves sexual
relations and the possibility of the birth or adoption of children.
Yet, above all else, the bond of the relationship is the mutual
love and respect each of the partners has for the other. 2°
Both commentators' contemporary definitions of marriage are broad
199. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
200. Comment, supra note 14, at 201.
201. See Catherine M. Cullem, Fundamental Interests and the Question of Same-Sex
Marriage, 15 TULSA L.J. 141, 144 (1979); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn.
1971), appealdismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187,1196 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1974).
202. See Edward Veitch, The Essence of Marriage-A Comment on the Homosexual
Challenge, 5 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 41 (1976). In today's "modern marriage" there is "clear
evidence of rising divorce rates, the increasing rate of remarriage and the facts of decreasing family sizes in the trend to zero population growth." Id. at 42.
203. Id. at 43.
204. Id. For support of the proposition that lesbians and gay men engage in the essential functions of marriage, see Friedman, supra note 4, at 152-60.
205. Cullem, supra note 201, at 151.
206. Id. at 152.
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2 7
enough to encompass same-sex marriages under the right to marry. 1

2. Is Same-Sex Marriage Included in the Right To Privacy?
The Baehr court's holding that the right to same-sex marriage does not
exist within the right to privacy of the Fourteenth Amendment is in accord with the traditional role of the due process clause.20 8 Constitutional
scholar Cass Sunstein observes that the due process clause "looks backward" because it "has been interpreted largely (though not exclusively)
to protect traditional practices against short-run departures. 20°9 The due
process clause serves this function especially in the right to privacy
cases, 2 10 which rely considerably on tradition for the definition of a fundamental right.21 1
Reliance upon tradition creates many difficulties because traditions
may be described at varying levels of generality.2 12 Complications may
arise when the following occurs:
the general tradition of respect meets a particular context in
which the general tradition has been repudiated and, to that extent, does not exist at all. There is no established tradition of
protection of abortion, marital privacy, or use of contraception.
In the hard cases, part of the question is whether the tradition
should be read at a level of generality that draws the particular
practice into question. Many of the important privacy cases
read the role of tradition in precisely this way.21 3
For example, the issue in Bowers214 could have been alternatively
phrased as whether there is a fundamental right to intimate
207. Id.
208. Analysis of the due process clause to the United States Constitution is relevant
because Hawaii courts interpret the state constitution's right to privacy provision in accordance with the federal standard. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
209. Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientationand the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (1988).
210. Id. at 1172.
211. See Developments in the Law, supra note 55, at 1178-79. "When an interest is
initially brought before the Court for recognition as a fundamental liberty, the Court has
often quite explicitly inquired into the interest's foundation in tradition." Id. at 1178.
However, in determining whether a right is fundamental, the Court looks not only to tradition, but also to whether the right is "something in which we continue to believe." Id. at
1179. For an argument that same-sex marriages are traditional, see Damslet, supra note 4,
at 556.
212. Sunstein, supra note 209, at 1173; see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRUST 60-63 (1980).
213. Sunstein, supra note 209, at 1173.
214. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
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association.
In Baehr, the court did not recognize a right to enter into a same-sex
marriage because it formulated the issue narrowly, considering only
whether there is "a fundamental constitutional right to same-sex marriage. 2 16 Yet, had the court framed the issue more generally, it could
have found a fundamental right to intimate association, which would include the right to enter into a same-sex marriage. 17
Manipulation of a tradition's level of generality has been criticized for
subverting the purpose of the 'test because it brings non-traditional rights
within the scope of protection. 2 1 However, those who argue for raising
the level of generality find this criticism misplaced. Proponents of this
method do not contend that the nontraditional right is actually traditional; rather, they require that, given the traditional respect for the right,
there must be "some principled basis" for considering the right differently
in the nontraditional context.2 1 9 The Baehr court could have asked
whether there is a fundamental right to marry, and then considered
whether there was a principled reason for denying it to same-sex
couples.220 As such, this approach utilizes equal protection analysis, but
not exclusively. Because same-sex couples have never been considered a
suspect class, only a rational basis test would be applied under equal protection analysis. Due process analysis is then used to apply a strict scrutiny test. A statute that infringes on the fundamental right to marry
would be subject to strict scrutiny, and thus would fail.22 1
Even if the method of raising the generality level of a tradition is accepted, Harvard professor Jed Rubenfeld raises other problems with the
approach.2 2 For example, Justice Blackmun suggested in his Bowers dissent that the state cannot bar any form of "sexual intimacy. ' 22 3 The diffi215. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 206 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "The
Court claims that its decision today merely refuses to recognize a fundamental right to
engage in homosexual sodomy; what the Court really has refused to recognize is the fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of their intimate associations
with others." Id.
216. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 57 (Haw. 1993).
217. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
218. Developments in the Law, supra note 55, at 1182.
219. Id.
220. See Damslet, supra note 4, at 582. "By framing the question as whether there is a
special fundamental right to same-sex marriage, the court confused its equal protection
analysis and its due process analysis." Id.
221. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 (1978).
222. See Rubenfeld, supra note 34, at 752-82.
223. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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culty is that Blackmun would have to explain why sexual intimacy "in its
various forms rises to constitutional stature. 22 4 Commentators frequently invoke this "personhood" concept to justify the protection of a
particular right as fundamental.2 25 They argue that actions essential to
"our identity as persons" must remain inviolable, at least as against the
state. 226 Rejecting the "personhood" thesis, 227 Rubenfeld articulates an
anti-totalitarian right to privacy.
Right to privacy methodology usually begins by considering what conduct is prohibited, and determining whether that conduct is fundamental.22 8 Rubenfeld suggests that we begin "by asking not what is being
prohibited,but what is being produced.,229 From this perspective, he observes that "[t]he distinctive and singular characteristic of the laws against
which the right to privacy has been applied lies in their productive or
affirmative consequences. ' 230 These laws "tend to take over the lives of
the persons involved: they occupy and preoccupy" and "inform the total-

ity of a person's life."

231

Under Rubenfeld's anti-totalitarian analysis, same-sex marriage should
be protected by the right to privacy. Analyzing Loving from the perspective of the affirmative consequences produced by laws prohibiting interracial marriage, he concluded that marriage is an undertaking that
substantially shapes "the totality of a person's daily life and consciousness." 2 32 Although his analysis considered only opposite sex marriage, it
is not limited to this context. Because the analysis looks not to what the
laws prohibit (interracial or same-sex marriage) but to what they produce,233 a law prohibiting same-sex marriage has the same effect as a law
prohibiting interracial marriage: both the same-sex couple and interracial
couple are denied marriage licenses.
224. Rubenfeld, supra note 34, at 750.
225. See id. at 752-82.
226. Id. at 753.
227. Id. at 782. Rubenfeld argues that the personhood thesis must be rejected, ultimately because "it betrays privacy's - if not personhood's own - political aspirations. By
conceiving of the conduct that it purports to protect as 'essential to the individual's identity,' personhood inadvertently reintroduces into privacy analysis the very premise of the
invidious uses of state power it seeks to overcome." Id.
228. Id. at 783.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 784.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 801-02. See id. at 791-92 (Rubenfeld applies his anti-totalitarian analysis to
Loving).
233. Id. at 784.
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In addition, Rubenfeld's analysis of Bowers lends support to the argument that same-sex marriages are protected by a right to privacy defined
as "the fundamental freedom not to have one's life too totally determined
by a progressively more normalizing state." 2 ' Laws against homosexual
sex violate the right to privacy because they maintain "institutionalized
sexual identities and normalized reproductive relations. '23 5 Indeed, the
same affirmative consequences are produced by a ban on same-sex marriage. Consequently, a law that prohibits same-sex marriage violates the
anti-totalitarian view of the right to privacy.
C. Equal Protection
If HRS § 572-1 is declared unconstitutional under Hawaii's equal protection clause, the result will be consistent with the role of the equal protection clause to the Fourteenth Amendment. Sunstein observes that the
equal protection clause to the United States Constitution "looks forward," operating "to protect disadvantaged groups from discriminatory
practices, however deeply engrained and longstanding. '236 Because
same-sex marriage has not been traditionally recognized,23 7 laws prohibiting it are probably more likely to be struck down under equal protection, rather than due process analysis.238
Even if Loving does not support the conclusion that a statute prohibiting same-sex marriage discriminates on the basis of sex, 239 several commentators argue that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a
form of discrimination on the basis of sex.2" ° Sunstein summarizes the
arguments:
Advocates of that position argue that discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation is (a) at least on its face, a form of sex
discrimination; (b) part of a system of sex role stereotyping; and
(c) even if in not readily apparent ways, a method of disadvantaging women.2 41
234. Id.
235. Id. at 800.
236. Sunstein, supra note 209, at 1163.
237. But see Damslet, supra note 4, at 558-60.
238. But see Friedman, supra note 4, at 152. "[B]ecause the values served by the institution of marriage-"family values"-are reflected most straightforwardly in substantive due
process privacy doctrine, states' failure to recognize same-sex marriages is most appropriately challenged under that doctrine." Id.
239. See supra notes 177-87 and accompanying text.
240. See generally Law, supra note 187; Claudia A. Lewis, Note, From This Day Forward: A Feminine Moral Discourse on Homosexual Marriage,97 YALE L.J. 1783 (1983).
241. Sunstein, supra note 209, at 1163 n.11.
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Acceptance of the argument that laws proscribing homosexual conduct
are a form of discrimination on the basis of sex would fill the logical gap
in the Loving v. Virginia analogy.242
In the alternative, laws prohibiting same-sex marriage could be subject
to strict scrutiny on the basis that homosexuals are a suspect class.2 43
However, the Supreme Court has indicated its unwillingness to declare,
any other suspect classes, 2 " and in light of its decision in Bowers, suspect
classification of homosexuals is even less likely. 4 5
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Baehr court's conclusion that HRS § 572-1 classifies on the basis of
sex is not supported by the reasons that statutes classifying on the basis of
sex have been accorded heightened scrutiny. Moreover, the court did not
follow its own reasoning for determining the standard to be applied to
sex-based classifications. Consequently, the court may have been considering other reasons when it decided to subject the statute to the strict
scrutiny test. Its rationale allowed it to avoid other approaches that
would require it to proclaim a new legal principle, such as expanding the
definition of marriage, raising the generality of the right to marriage to
include same-sex marriage, or endorsing the anti-totalitarian theory of
the right to privacy. The United States Supreme Court has never indicated support for any of these approaches. Even more controversial
would be for the court to apply strict scrutiny based on the premise that
discrimination on the basis of homosexuality is discrimination on the basis of sex, or that homosexuals constitute a "suspect class." Although the
court may not be prepared to adopt any of these arguments that would
strike down a statute prohibiting same-sex marriage, such arguments
could justify an otherwise unsound decision. Indeed, such arguments indicate that Baehr was correctly decided, even if the court is presently unable to acknowledge the reasons.
Megan E. Farrell
242. See supra part V.A.

243. See Note, The ConstitutionalStatus of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1985); Note, An Argument for the Application
of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S.
CAL. L. REV. 797 (1984); see generally Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98
HARV. L. REV. 713, 740-46 (1985); but see Comment, supra note 14, at 202-06.
244. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445-46 (1985); Friedman,
supra note 4, at 147-49.
245. See Friedman, supra note 4, at 149.
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